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practice. All these aspects share a concern that participants in con-
centrated markets may not behave in a competitive, socially efficient
fashion unless there is active market entry to keep them ‘‘honest.’’ The
theory has generated a number of factors that should be important to
market entry, the empirical literature has tested some of these hy-
pothesized factors, and antitrust authorities have weighed these factors
in their approval/denial processes.
The theories and tests of market entry to date have focused pri-
marily on factors such as profitability, concentration, and growth of
the market, which may proxy the prospects of future abnormal profits
and invite entry. There has been little dynamic analysis of entry in
response to the activities of the incumbent market participants, and, in
particular, there has been little analysis of the effects of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) on subsequent entry. This is surprising, given the
important role that M&As play in changing the structure and com-
petitive conditions in a market, and the role that future entry prospects
in response to M&As play in antitrust analysis.
The commercial banking industry provides an almost ideal labo-
ratory for analyzing these issues. Banks produce relatively homo-
geneous products in a large number of geographically segmented
markets of various sizes, with different M&A experiences, and other
variations in market structure and economic conditions. We examine
entry activity in over 2,700 local banking markets—metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) or non-MSA counties across the United
States—during a period of 19 years from 1980 to 1998, for a total of
over 52,000 market-year observations and almost 4,000 actual market
entries. We are able to trace the effects of over 10,000 bank M&As
over the time period and distinguish among several types of consoli-
dation. This contrasts well with most other studies of entry, which
typically have many fewer observations, often use four-digit SIC
categories that represent much more heterogeneous products and
services, and generally do not have information on M&A activity.
The banking data also allow us to examine the effects of regulatory
differences on the probability of de novo entry. Over our sample
period, a number of states had unit banking laws and other regulations
that restricted existing banks from expanding into new local markets.
We hypothesize that these geographic restrictions on competition
create local market power, which, in turn, may increase the probability
of de novo entry. That is, barriers to one type of local market entry
(branching by existing banks in other markets) may create incentives
and opportunities for another type of entry (de novo entry by banks
with new charters).
The issue of entry into local banking markets in response to bank
M&As raises policy concerns as well as being an interesting research
question. Whether or not there is new entry after consolidation activity
798 Journal of Business
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has important implications for antitrust policy and the efficiency of
banking markets. An additional policy issue concerns the adequate
supply of funds to bank-dependent small businesses. The extant re-
search discussed here suggests that the consolidation of the banking
industry results in substantially reduced small business lending by
banks that engage in M&A activity but that there may be an ‘‘exter-
nal’’ effect of M&As in which other lenders in the same local markets
make up for some of this reduced supply. New entrants may be part of
this ‘‘external’’ effect.
Although the amount of lending by de novo entrants is small relative
to the total lending of the banking industry, recent research discussed
here suggests that these entrants may provide substantial external
effects in response to M&As in terms of small business lending in their
local markets. This research suggests that small banks devote much
higher proportions of their assets to small business loans than the large
banks typically involved in M&As, and de novo entrants have even
higher ratios of small business loans to assets than other small banks.
Thus, the relatively high small business lending of recent entrants can
make up for a substantial portion of any reduced supply of small
business loans from consolidation in a local market. To illustrate, one
recent study (Berger, Goldberg, and White 2001) found that the aver-
age ratio of small business loans to assets was 13.64% for ‘‘young’’
small banks (age 5 years, assets $100 million), 7.55% for ‘‘mature’’
small banks (age>20 years, assets$100 million), and 2.95% for very
large banks (all ages, assets >$10 billion). Based on these data, if a
very large bank were to merge with a ‘‘mature’’ small bank that has
$100 million in assets and it were to apply the large bank’s lending
policies to the consolidated bank, its small business loans would de-
crease by $4.6 million ( 0:0755 0:0295½   $100 million). A single
de novo entrant with just $33.72 million in assets [$4.6 million/0.1364]
could replace this entire decrease in lending. This recent study also
found that the additional competition of a de novo entrant may stim-
ulate small business lending by other small banks in the local market.
As well, the threat of new entry may result in the consolidating banks
and other market incumbents increasing their supplies of small busi-
ness credit in anticipation of possible entry.
We address these research and policy issues in this paper. We es-
timate a dynamic empirical model of entry into local banking markets
that includes M&A activity and other market factors. The findings
suggest that bank M&As are associated with statistically and eco-
nomically significant increases in the probability of subsequent entry
into the same local markets. We also ensure that the findings are robust
by subjecting them to robustness checks that (1) use alternative econo-
metric methods, (2) change the specifications of the dependent and
exogenous variables, and (3) alter the data samples.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the relevant literature on entry in general and in the banking
industry in particular. Section 3 describes the empirical literature on
the effects of bank M&As on market power, efficiency, and the supply
of small business credit by banks in the market, effects that may help
determine the probability of market entry. Section 4 gives some facts
about de novo entry in banking that help guide the empirical analysis.
Section 5 discusses the hypotheses, methodology, and variables em-
ployed in the analysis. Section 6 summarizes the empirical results, and
Section 7 concludes.
II. Prior Evidence on Entry
In this section, we first discuss the empirical evidence on entry
in general, then turn to evidence on entry in the banking industry.
Section 3 reviews the empirical literature on the effects of bank M&As,
which may help determine the probability of entry in the local banking
markets.
A. The General Entry Literature
Theory, beginning at least with Bain (1956) and Sylos-Labini
(1962), predicts entry when there are strong prospects for future
abnormal profits. The empirical literature has concentrated primarily
on factors such as profitability, concentration, and growth to serve as
proxies for expected future abnormal profits from entry. The dy-
namic effects of M&As are generally not considered in the empirical
literature.
Siegfried and Evans (1994) summarized the empirical work on
entry across industries, in both the United States and other countries.1
They found that entry is positively related to industry profitability
and growth. Earlier empirical research by Siegfried and Evans
(1992) found that entry rates and exit rates are positively correlated.
They interpreted exit, however, as firms’ responses to declining
prospects, as would occur when a firm is liquidated or acquired by
another firm after a string of losses. They did not address the pos-
sibility that M&As (as a form of exit) occur in good times as well as
bad.
Another review by Geroski (1995) found that de novo entry is
common across industries, but entrants appear to have short life spans.
The survival rate of entrants is low, and it takes more than a decade to
achieve the size of the average incumbent when entrants do survive.
Entry rates vary more within industries than across industries. Even
1. Important studies of non-U.S. industries include Orr (1974), Baldwin and Gorecki
(1991), Morch von der Fehr (1991), and Mata (1993).
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though there is substantial entry, econometric estimates indicate that
entry barriers are high. Entry reacts slowly to high profits, and it is
difficult to estimate entry rates using measures of profitability and entry
barriers.
Further, the ex post economic effects of entry do not follow theo-
retical expectations as closely as would be expected. Entry has only
modest effects on average price-cost margins. Incumbent response to
entry is selective. Pricing is not usually used to block entry, although
marketing efforts are used for this purpose. Most of the literature
examines short-term effects of entry rather than long-term effects, so it
is not surprising to find that entry does not greatly affect profitability.
Entry does appear to be associated with high rates of innovation
and increases in efficiency. Geroski (1995) concluded that the pro-
competitive effects of entry may be exaggerated and that active rivalry
among existing firms in the market is preferable to entry since entry is
often too slow, too small in scale, and too erratic to have substantial
effects.
There are distinct advantages to examining regulated industries. The
government mandates substantial data requirements of regulated firms.
Also, many of these regulated markets are local, allowing the re-
searcher to segment the regulated industry into geographic markets,
thus permitting more extensive analysis of the industry. In addition to
banking, entry studies have been performed on one other regulated
industry, airlines.
For the airline industry, Joskow, Werden, and Johnson (1994) found
that entry and exit have important competitive effects, contrary to the
interindustry findings. They found that, although entry is generally
not induced by above-normal price levels on a city-pair basis, entry
reduces fares and increases output, while exit increases fares and
reduces output. In addition, incumbents cut price and maintain output
in response to entry, whereas survivors increase both price and output
in response to exit.
Thus, the findings from the literature outside of banking as a
whole cast doubt on the ability of entry to restrain anticompetitive
behavior and are consistent with a continued need for antitrust re-
straint on M&As. Essentially, the findings suggest that entry frequently
does not occur to curb the exercise of market power. Moreover,
although entry may ‘‘work’’ in terms of lowering prices when it
does occur, the effect may be short-lived because of the low survival
rate.
B. The Bank Entry Literature
The most relevant entry evidence for our study comes from research
on the banking industry. More detailed data are available for banking
than any other industry, and the results of these studies are more in line
801The Dynamics of Market Entry
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with theoretical models of market behavior. We focus on several re-
cent studies here.2
Amel and Liang (1997) estimated a two-equation model of entry
and profits for 1977–1988. Their results support the existence of a
competitive process in banking markets: New entrants were attracted
by high profits, market size, and market growth.3 They also found that
entry reduces market power in pricing.
Moore and Skelton (1998) examined the paradox of the recent in-
crease in de novo bank entry, given the decrease in the total number of
banking organizations at the same time. Most of the analysis covers
the year 1997. They found that de novo banks organize to take ad-
vantage of local conditions favoring entry, such as high growth and
deficiencies in the provision of certain services (e.g., small business
lending). The authors concluded that new banks increased the level of
competition in some markets.
Finally, some recent research confirms our findings of a strong
positive effect of M&As on subsequent de novo entry in the same
local markets. Seelig and Critchfield (2002) examined the determi-
nants of entry in banking in MSAs over 1995 to1997 and originally
found a significant negative relationship between mergers and de novo
entry. However, those results were due to a programming error. In
their updated paper, they corrected the error, added data from 1998,
and made other changes; their findings are now reversed and consis-
tent with ours.4
III. Prior Evidence on the Effects of Bank M&As
Despite very little direct empirical evidence on the effects of bank
M&As on subsequent entry, there is substantial evidence on other
effects of M&As that may influence entry decisions. M&As can affect
the probability of de novo entry in the same local market in at least
three ways. First, M&As may affect the exercise of market power
in setting prices. The probability of entry should vary directly with
the change in market power. Second, M&As may change the effi-
ciency of the M&A participants or other local competitors. The prob-
ability of entry should vary inversely with the change in efficiency, as
more efficient incumbents may be stronger future competitors. Third,
2. See also Rhoades (1997) for an extensive discussion of the barriers to entry in
banking.
3. Amel and Liang define entry by either de novo charters by new banks or new branch
offices by existing banks from other markets. In contrast, we focus exclusively on de novo
charters.
4. A Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review article (Keeton 2000)
reviewed both an earlier version of our paper and the original Seelig and Critchfield working
paper and did some additional analysis that also supports our finding that M&As tend to
increase the probability of subsequent entry into banking markets.
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M&As may affect the supply of small business credit in the local
market. The probability of entry should vary directly with the degree to
which institutions participating in M&As reduce their supply of this
credit.
We characterize the studies of M&As as either static or dynamic
analyses. Static analyses examine the effects of changes in bank char-
acteristics associated with M&As, such as increased size or market
concentration. Dynamic analyses compare the data for banks after
M&As with pre-M&A data or with data on other banks that have not
recently engaged in M&As. Dynamic analyses incorporate the pos-
sibility that M&As may involve changes in organizational focus, dif-
ferences in managerial behavior, or disruptions from consummating
M&As as well as the static effects. A comprehensive survey of the con-
sequences of bank M&As is found in Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999). We highlight those findings, and review newer studies not
referenced in that survey.
A. Bank M&As and Market Power
M&As between banks with significant local market overlap ex ante
may increase local market concentration and allow the consolidated
bank and other banks in the local market to raise profits by setting
prices less favorable to customers. This may affect rates and fees on
small business loans and small deposits, as these products are gener-
ally competed for on a local basis. M&As of the market-extension type
that join banks in different local markets are less likely to increase
local market power. The static literature on the effects of local market
concentration generally found that banks in more concentrated mar-
kets charge higher rates on small business loans and pay lower rates on
small deposits and that their deposit rates were ‘‘sticky’’ or slow to
respond to changes in open-market interest rates, consistent with the
exercise of market power.
Dynamic studies of the effects of bank M&As on prices have
yielded mixed results as to the overall importance of M&As to the
prices charged by M&A participants and their local market rivals.
However, for in-market M&As with significant market overlap, there
are strong effects on deposit prices. Thus, at least some types of
M&As appear to boost the exercise of market power in pricing, which
may increase the probability of entry.5
5. Note that potential M&As that would result in large increases in concentration
and market power may not actually occur. Antitrust authorities often block, alter, or
deter M&As that are expected to result in substantial increases in market power. Such
M&As may also be deterred by the prospects of entry, which may raise output or lower
prices so as to eliminate most of the private gains to these M&As (Werden and Froeb
1998).
803The Dynamics of Market Entry
#04409 UCP: BN article # 770405
B. Bank M&As and Efficiency
M&As may affect the scale, scope, or product mix efficiency by
moving the banks to a different output vector. M&As may also change
X-efficiency if the consolidated bank alters its organizational focus or
managerial behavior or suffers disruptions from consummating the
M&A. Banks may also improve their efficiency, broadly defined, by
diversifying their portfolios and improving their risk-expected return
trade-offs.
Static studies of the scale, scope, and product mix efficiencies using
1980s data generally suggest little or no cost-efficiency improvement
from the change in the output vector, although recent research sug-
gests that the scale economies may have increased in the 1990s. The
size and geographic spread of interstate banking organizations also
appears to improve the risk-expected return trade-offs for many of
these banks, increasing efficiency, broadly defined.
Dynamic studies of the X-efficiency effects of bank M&As gener-
ally have found very little or no cost-efficiency improvement (see also
Kim and White 2001). However, studies of the profit-efficiency effects
found that M&As improved profit efficiency and this improvement
could be linked to improved diversification of risks. Therefore, the
evidence generally suggests that M&As may improve the efficiency of
the M&A participants somewhat on average, which may deter de novo
entry.
C. Bank M&As and Small Business Lending
Bank M&As may reduce the supply of credit to some relationship-
dependent small business borrowers as the consolidated banks at least
partially exit from this niche of the market. This may occur because
the larger, more organizationally complex banks created by M&As
may encounter organizational diseconomies from providing relationship-
based loans along with the transactions-based loans in which these
banks tend to specialize. This may also occur because of difficul-
ties in transmitting the type of ‘‘soft’’ information that relationship
lending often requires through the communication channels of large
organizations (Stein 2002). It is also possible that short-term dis-
ruptions caused by the consolidation process itself may give other
banks, either local incumbents or new entrants, the opportunity to
take away customers who perceive a reduction in service quality or
availability.
Supporting these arguments, static studies found that larger banks
devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small business lending
than do smaller institutions. Some evidence also suggests that, spe-
cifically, relationship-dependent small borrowers tend to receive less
credit from large banks. A number of dynamic studies examined the
804 Journal of Business
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effects of U.S. bank M&As on small business lending. A common
finding is that M&As in which one or more of the banking organ-
izations is large tend to reduce small business lending, although there
are exceptions.
As noted previously, some research also found that there may be a
dynamic ‘‘external’’ effect of M&As, in which other lenders make up
for some of the reduced supply by banks that engage in M&As (see
also Berger, Goldberg, and White 2001; Avery and Samolyk 2004).
De novo entry could be an important component of this external effect
if M&As increase the probability of new entry. This could yield a
relatively large effect, as discussed already, since recent de novo
entrants tend to have relatively high small business loan ratios.
Importantly, the research often found that both the direct effects and
external effects of consolidation differed by the type of M&A. In
particular, mergers (consolidations of bank charters) had different
effects from acquisitions (banks retaining their charters but changing
their top-tier bank-holding-company ownership).
IV. Some Facts about De Novo Entry
This section presents some statistics about de novo entry in U.S.
banking and some of the factors associated with this entry. These data
suggest some potentially important determinants of entry that are in-
corporated in our multivariate empirical analysis.
Table 1 reports statistics on the annual frequency of de novo entry
into local U.S. banking markets (defined as metropolitan statistical
areas or non-MSA counties) over the period 1980–1998. As shown
in the bottom row of Part A of the table, there were 52,598 total
market-years, or 19 years times an average of 2,768 local markets in
each year.6 The bottom row also shows that 50,383 times or 95.79%
of the time no new banks entered the market. Although entry oc-
curred only 4.21% of the time, this still represents a tremendous
amount of entry, with 3,875 total entries or 7.37 entries per 100 local
markets per year. A number of markets had many entrants in the same
year. On 124 separate occasions, 5 or more banks entered the same
market in the same year, with a maximum of 40 banks (in Houston
in 1983).
The data in Panel A suggest that market size is a strong positive
determinant of the probability of entry and number of entrants. The
6. Although these market definitions are imperfect, there is considerable research evidence
supporting these local geographic demarcations as the markets for retail banking products
such as small business loans and retail deposits. Survey data indicate that small businesses
and households almost always choose a local financial institution (Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and
Wolken 1997), whereas corporate customers may shop for wholesale financial services in
national or international markets.























TABLE 1 Frequency of Commercial Bank De Novo Entry by Size of Market (Annual Data 1980–1998)
Number and Percent of Market Years with Various Numbers of Entrants
Market Size









Panel A: All Markets
<$100M 18319 152 3 2 0.86 158 18474
99.16% 0.82% 0.02% 100.00%
$100–300M 19545 361 9 2 1.90 379 19915
98.14% 1.81% 0.05% 100.00%
$300M–$1B 9067 377 40 3 1 4 4.95 470 9488
95.56% 3.97% 0.42% 0.03% 0.01% 100.00%
$1–5B 2808 468 87 23 6 2 3 1 11 22.78 774 3398
82.64% 13.77% 2.56% 0.68% 0.18% 0.06% 0.09% 0.03% 100.00%
>$5B 644 307 132 80 42 27 58 24 9 40 158.28 2094 1323
48.68% 23.20% 9.98% 6.05% 3.17% 2.04% 4.38% 1.81% 0.68% 100.00%
TOTAL 50383 1665 271 106 49 29 61 25 9 40 7.37 3875 52598
95.79% 3.17% 0.52% 0.20% 0.09% 0.06% 0.12% 0.05% 0.02% 100.00%
Panel B: Metropolitan Markets
<$100M 3 0 0.00 0 3
100.00%
$100–300M 12 2 1 14.29 2 14
85.71% 14.29% 100.00%
$300M–$1B 1398 113 21 2 3 10.50 161 1534
91.13% 7.37% 1.37% 0.13% 100.00%
$1–5B 2598 454 83 23 6 2 3 1 11 23.72 752 3170
81.96% 14.32% 2.62% 0.73% 0.19% 0.06% 0.09% 0.03% 100.00%
>$5B 643 306 132 80 42 27 58 24 9 40 158.44 2093 1321
48.68% 23.16% 9.99% 6.06% 3.18% 2.04% 4.39% 1.82% 0.68% 100.00%
TOTAL 4654 875 236 105 48 29 61 25 9 40 49.78 3008 6042






































Panel C: Rural Markets
<$100M 18316 152 3 2 0.86 158 18471
99.16% 0.82% 0.02% 100.00%
$100–300M 19533 359 9 2 1.89 377 19901
98.15% 1.80% 0.05% 100.00%
$300M–$1B 7669 264 19 1 1 4 3.88 309 7954
96.42% 3.32% 0.24% 0.01% 0.01% 100.00%
$1–5B 210 14 4 2 9.65 22 228
92.11% 6.14% 1.75% 100.00%
>$5B 1 1 1 50.00 1 2
50.00% 50.00% 100.00%
TOTAL 45729 790 35 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 1.86 866 46556
98.22% 1.70% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Notes.— Entry is defined as a new bank charter (federal or state); we exclude all entrants with gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $1 billion by the end of the entry year.
Banking markets are defined as Metropolitian Statistical Areas (MSAs) or non–MSA counties.
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size classes are based on total deposits in the market, adjusted to be
in constant 1994 dollars using the GDP deflator. In the smallest
two market size classes (less than $300 million in deposits), there
was only about a 1–2% probability of entry and never more than
two entries in the same market in the same year. These small
markets had only about 14% of all entries, despite having about
73% of the total market-years. By contrast, in the largest market size
class (over $5 billion in deposits), entry occurred 51.32% of the time,
with most cases of entry involving multiple entrants. On average,
these large markets had 158.28 entrants per 100 markets per year,
or more than 1.5 entrants per market per year. The 2,094 entries in
these large markets account for more than half of all 3,875 de novo
entries, although these markets account for less than 3% of the total
market-years.
Panels B and C of table 1 segment the data by metropolitan (MSA)
versus rural (non-MSA) markets. Of the 1,323 market years with de-
posits over $5 billion, 1,321 are MSAs and only 2 are rural. By con-
trast, of the 38,389 market years with deposits under $300 million,
38,372 are rural and only 17 are MSAs. In the middle size classes in
which both metropolitan and rural markets are well represented,
metropolitan markets appear to have substantially higher probabilities
of entry and greater numbers of entrants per market.
Based on these findings, we conduct separate multivariate analyses
for three subsets of the data: (1) large metropolitan markets (deposits
>$5 billion); (2) small metropolitan markets (deposits $5 billion);
and (3) rural markets of all sizes. This segmentation provides a better
chance of disentangling the effects of M&As from the effects of
market size and market type, which are highly correlated with both
entry and M&A activity.
In table 2, Panels A, B, and C show the frequency of entry by year
and by whether or not there was M&A activity in the local market in
the previous years, that is, by whether or not at least one local bank
survived a merger of bank charters or was acquired by a different top-
tier bank holding company (BHC) in the three prior years. As dis-
cussed, we hypothesize that recent M&As in the local market increase
the probability of entry, and the data strongly support this hypothesis.
In every year of the sample, (1) the overwhelming majority of de novo
entries were in markets with recent M&A activity, (2) the frequency of
entry per market was much higher in markets with M&A activity, and
(3) entries per 100 markets were many times higher in M&A markets
than in non-M&A markets. To illustrate, in 1998, (1) M&A markets
had 188 entries versus 2 entries in non-M&A markets, (2) M&A
markets had entry 5.77% of the time versus 0.33% of the time in non-
M&A markets, and (3) M&A markets had 8.68 entries per 100 mar-
kets versus 0.33 entries per 100 non-M&A markets. These results also























TABLE 2 Commercial Bank De Novo Entry by Prior M&A Activity and by State Banking Regulations
A: ENTRY IN MARKETS WITH
PRIOR M&A ACTIVITY
B: ENTRY IN MARKETS WITHOUT


























1980 143 9.69% 19.51 733 70 3.11% 3.46 2025 213 4.86% 7.72 2758
1981 149 8.61% 18.06 825 61 2.63% 3.15 1937 210 4.42% 7.60 2762
1982 231 9.32% 25.33 912 90 4.11% 4.87 1849 321 5.83% 11.63 2761
1983 295 9.35% 28.72 1027 77 3.45% 4.43 1737 372 5.64% 13.46 2764
1984 326 9.11% 27.26 1196 82 3.95% 5.22 1570 408 6.18% 14.75 2766
1985 286 9.12% 21.92 1305 50 3.08% 3.42 1462 336 5.93% 12.14 2767
1986 233 7.56% 16.32 1428 26 1.93% 1.93 1344 259 4.83% 9.34 2772
1987 203 7.24% 13.36 1520 14 1.13% 1.13 1243 217 4.49% 7.85 2763
1988 221 7.27% 14.73 1500 17 1.35% 1.35 1256 238 4.57% 8.64 2756
1989 194 6.83% 12.75 1522 9 0.72% 0.72 1250 203 4.08% 7.32 2772
1990 159 6.56% 10.43 1524 11 0.88% 0.88 1247 170 4.01% 6.13 2771
1991 104 4.86% 6.32 1645 10 0.89% 0.89 1126 114 3.25% 4.11 2771
1992 73 3.36% 4.54 1609 6 0.52% 0.52 1162 79 2.17% 2.85 2771
1993 59 2.94% 3.62 1630 4 0.35% 0.35 1134 63 1.88% 2.28 2764
1994 44 2.35% 2.59 1702 4 0.37% 0.37 1075 48 1.58% 1.73 2777
1995 97 3.78% 5.02 1933 7 0.83% 0.83 844 104 2.88% 3.75 2777
1996 144 5.21% 7.08 2034 4 0.54% 0.54 743 148 3.96% 5.33 2777
1997 178 6.29% 8.48 2099 4 0.59% 0.59 677 182 4.90% 6.56 2776











































TABLE 2 (Continued )


























1980 95 5.85% 9.92 958 62 3.93% 4.60 1347 56 6.65% 14.89 376
1981 99 5.08% 11.17 886 58 3.66% 4.08 1422 53 6.63% 14.06 377
1982 154 7.68% 17.40 885 97 4.73% 6.95 1396 70 6.72% 17.41 402
1983 201 9.09% 26.87 748 90 3.91% 5.87 1534 81 6.93% 20.05 404
1984 190 9.97% 32.09 592 141 4.52% 8.38 1682 77 8.70% 18.60 414
1985 142 8.26% 23.95 593 140 5.02% 8.37 1672 54 7.31% 12.74 424
1986 95 7.25% 16.02 593 118 3.86% 7.35 1606 46 5.89% 9.35 492
1987 40 4.06% 6.77 591 126 3.88% 7.88 1600 51 7.66% 10.28 496
1988 18 3.74% 8.41 214 163 4.66% 8.94 1824 57 5.16% 8.91 640
1989 17 4.19% 7.91 215 63 2.48% 4.46 1413 123 6.53% 11.64 1057
1990 19 4.19% 8.84 215 59 2.96% 4.60 1283 92 5.40% 7.76 1186
1991 2 3.51% 3.51 57 34 2.45% 3.21 1060 78 3.96% 4.98 1567
1992 25 1.97% 2.47 1014 54 2.40% 3.23 1670
1993 21 1.58% 2.07 1014 42 2.16% 2.52 1666
1994 13 1.29% 1.40 927 35 1.82% 1.99 1758
1995 23 2.16% 2.48 927 81 3.41% 4.61 1757
1996 47 3.88% 5.07 927 101 4.21% 5.75 1757
1997 52 4.32% 5.62 926 130 5.46% 7.40 1757
1998 34 2.88% 3.92 156 5.63% 8.61 1812
Note.— Entry is defined as a new bank charter (federal or state); we exclude all entrants with gross total assets (GTA) exceeding $1 billion by the end of the entry year.
Banking markets are defined as MSAs or non-MSA counties. A market is considered to have prior M&A activity if in any of the previous three years, any bank in the market
was involved in a merger (two or more bank charters were consolidated) or an acquisition (charter retained but change of bank holding company ownership).
Unit banking regulations generally allow only one full service office per bank.
Banks in limited branching states can have multiple branches, but these are restricted in some way (e.g., branches in only one county).
Banks in statewide branching states face no limitations on within-state branching.
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depend on other factors that we try to control for in our multivariate
analysis. Nonetheless, the raw data are quite one-sided and fairly
persuasive on their own.
Two other findings are apparent from these data. First, the pro-
portion of markets with recent M&A activity increased steadily over
time, from less than 30% at the beginning of the period to over 75%
at the end. Second, there was substantially more entry in the U.S.
banking industry in the 1980s than in the 1990s, with over 200
entries in every year in the 1980s. One reason for the high fre-
quency of entry in the 1980s may be a liberalization of charter policy
at that time. Beginning in 1980, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency began to pay less attention to a community’s ‘‘capac-
ity’’ to support an additional bank in granting national bank charters
and allow market competition to determine entry and exit (White
1992).
In contrast with the 1980s, there were fewer than 200 entries in
every year of the 1990s (through 1998), including a low of just 48
entries in 1994. However, there was a substantial upswing over the
period 1995–1998, with a local maximum of 190 entrants in 1998.
The percent of markets with entry and the number of entries per 100
market years were generally lower in the 1990s as well.7
Panels D, E, and F of table 2 show entry statistics classified by state
banking regulations each year.8 Unit banking regulations generally
allow only one full service office per bank. Banks in limited branching
states can have multiple branches but are restricted in some way (e.g.,
branches in only one county). Over time, state geographic regulations
were substantially liberalized, and by the end of 1991, all unit banking
regulations had been eliminated.
As discussed, we hypothesize that the state restrictions on compe-
tition from existing firms outside the local market would create market
power and thereby increase de novo entry. In some cases, de novo
entry might be newly chartered banks opened by bank holding com-
panies as alternatives to establishing new branches where branching is
prohibited. For example, several BHCs owned a number of individual
banks in Texas in the 1980s, which was a unit banking state until
1987.
7. The frequency of entry over time does not correspond as well as might be expected
with aggregate banking industry profitability. Profitability was generally falling during the
mid-1980s, while entries were rising to their sample peaks. As well, the run of high prof-
itability began in the early 1990s, with record profits being reached in 1993 and 1994, the
years with the fewest entries. However, entries increased in the 1995–1998 time interval,
congruent with the strong aggregate profitability and other favorable conditions for the
banking industry of these years.
8. To be consistent with our empirical analysis, the state rules shown in table 2 are those
in effect as of December 31 of the prior year. This reduces endogeneity problems and assures
that the explanatory variables are known to those making the entry decisions.
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The data are only somewhat consistent with these predictions. During
the 1980s, unit banking markets generally had higher percentages
of entry and more entries per 100 markets than markets in limited
branching states but were not much different on average from markets
in statewide branching states. Presumably, markets in statewide branch-
ing states had statistics comparable to unit banking states because
statewide branching states tend to be those with relatively large
markets (e.g., California). This is controlled for in our multivariate
analysis.
A final set of findings not shown in the tables concerns de novo
entry by thrift institutions (savings and loans and savings banks). For
our main analysis, we include only commercial bank entry, since
thrifts typically do not compete effectively in the business loan mar-
ket. As discussed earlier, a policy question we address is the extent to
which any external effect of M&As on the small business lending of
other local lenders operates through de novo entry. Thrift institutions
typically devote an even smaller percentage of their assets to small
business loans than do the very largest commercial banks, so thrift
entry generally is not a significant part of the external effect of M&As
at issue here (Kwan 1998). Nonetheless, we include thrift entry as a
robustness check because many thrift products are substitutes for bank
products.
There were 743 thrift entries over our full time period of 1980–
1998, about 20% as many as commercial bank entries. Many of the
thrift entries occurred in the same markets in the same years as
commercial bank entries, so the percent of market years with entry by
commercial banks or thrifts was 4.65%, not much above the 4.21%
that commercial banks alone entered. Importantly, the thrift entries do
not alter the finding that entries occur much more often if there was
bank M&A activity in the local market in the prior 3 years. Over the
1995–1998 subperiod, M&A markets had 65 thrift entries versus 1
thrift entry in non-M&A markets. If anything, the thrift entry data are
even more one-sided than the commercial bank entry data shown in
table 2, strongly suggesting that M&A activity is associated with in-
creased likelihood of entry.
V. Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section, we outline our main hypotheses to be tested and our
empirical methodology. The hypotheses concern factors that may af-
fect the likelihood of de novo entry in a banking market, and we
develop empirical models of entry to test these hypotheses. The var-
iables used in the main entry regressions are described in detail in
table 3, along with the sample means and standard deviations of these
variables for the large metropolitan, small metropolitan, and rural























TABLE 3 Variables Employed in Entry Regressions (1980–1998 values)









ENTRY Dummy variable, equals 1 for any positive bank
entry, in a given banking market, in a given year.
Entry is defined as a new bank charter (federal
or state); we exclude all entrants with gross
total assets (GTA) exceeding $1 billion
by the end of the entry year and all commercial
banks with bank types coded as subject to special
analysis, such as bankers’ banks, credit card
banks, depository trust companies, and bridge
entities. Banking markets are defined as MSAs or









Market Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)
MKT-MERGE Share of local market deposits in banks involved in
mergers in which two or more bank charters are
consolidated, averaged over the previous 3 years.







MKT-ACQUIS Share of local market deposits in banks involved in
acquisitions in which the banks retain their
separate charters but their top-tier bank-holding-
company ownership changes, averaged over the


















































TABLE 3 (Continued )









MKT-HERF Local market Herfindahl index for the previous year,
based on deposits. The Herfindahl index is the sum
of the squared market shares of all banks in the







MKT-SHAREL Share of market deposits held by large banks
(GTA > $1B) for the previous year. GTA equals
total assets plus loan and lease loss reserves and
allocated transfer risk reserve (a reserve for
certain foreign loans). Sources: U.S. Call Reports;







MKT-SHAREM Share of market deposits held by medium-size banks
(GTA $100M–$1B) for the previous year. Sources:







MKT-SHAREC Share of market deposits held by complex banks
(owned by out-of-state or multilayered bank
holding company) for the previous year. Source:







UNITB Dummy variable, equals 1 for a unit banking state as
of the previous year. Unit banking states generally
allow only one full service office per bank. Sources:
Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995); Conference












































LIMITB Dummy variable, equals 1 for a limited branching state
as of the previous year. Limited branching states
generally permit a bank to have multiple branches,
but these are restricted in some way (e.g., branches
in only one county). (Statewide branching dummy is
excluded from the regressions as the base case).








NEWLIB Dummy variable, equals 1 if the state moved to a more
liberal branching rule during the previous year.








INTST Dummy variable, equals 1 for indicating that interstate
bank holding company expansion was allowed as of
the previous year. Sources: Berger et al. (1995);








MKT-GROW Growth rate of market deposits for the previous year.







STINCOME Real state income growth for the previous year. Source:







MKT-PFRAT Ratio of purchased funds/GTA (market averages) for the
previous year. Purchased funds are time deposits over
$100,000, foreign deposits, federal funds purchased,
demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, trading
liabilities, other borrowed money, mortgage
indebtedness and obligations under capitalized leases,








MKT-LNDEP Market size ( log of market deposits) for the previous
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MKT-MDEP1 Dummy variable, equals 1 if the metropolitan market
<$1B in deposits for the previous year. (This
variable is excluded as the base case in the 1995–





MKT-MDEP2 Dummy variable, equals 1 for metropolitan markets
$1B–$5B in deposits for the previous year. (This
variable is excluded as the base case in the 1980–





MKT-RDEP2 Dummy variable, equals 1 for rural market $100M–
$300M in deposits for the previous year. (Dummy
for rural markets less than $100M is excluded as
the base case in rural market regressions.) Source:
FDIC Summary of Deposits.
— — 0.445
(0.497)
MKT-RDEP3 Dummy variable, equals 1 for rural markets greater
than $300M in deposits for the previous year.




MKT-P1 Market average price of consumer loans (installment,
credit cards, and related plans to individuals, from
the bank’s domestic offices) for the previous year.
Price is interest income on consumer loans less
provision for loan and lease losses and allocated
transfer risk allocated to consumer loans, divided by












































MKT-P2 Market average price of non-real estate business
loans (commercial and industrial loans,
agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions,
etc.) for the previous year. Price is interest
income on business loans less provision for loan
and lease losses and allocated transfer risk
allocated to business loans, divided by stock of







MKT-P3 Market average price of real estate loans for the
previous year. Price is interest income on real
estate loans less provision for loan and lease
losses and allocated transfer risk allocated to real
estate loans, divided by stock of real estate loans.







MKT-P4 Market average price of securities (all nonloan
financial assets) for the previous year. Price is
interest income on securities, divided by stock







MKT-W1 Market average price of purchased funds for the
previous year. Price is expense of purchased
funds, divided by stock of purchased funds.







MKT-W2 Market average price of core deposits (domestic
transactions accounts, time deposits under
$100,000, and savings deposits) for the previous
year. Price is expense of core deposits, divided








MKT-W3 Market average price of labor (salary plus benefits,
in 1000s of constant 1994 dollars, per employee)
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Condition of Market Banks
MKT-ROE Average return on equity (net income, divided
by total equity capital) in market for the







MKT-NPL Market average nonperforming loan ratio for
the previous year. Nonperforming loan ratio
is loans past due at least 30 days or on a
nonaccrual basis, divided by total loans.







MKT-EQRAT Market average equity (net income)/GTA ratio








MKT-EFFIC Market average cost efficiency measure (the
negative of the market average residual
from estimated cost function) for the









D1981–D1998 Dummy variables for years 1981–1998 (1980 is
the base case).
Notes.—All financial values are measured in real 1994 dollars using the GDP deflator.
All variables with the MKT prefix refer to local-market-based measures. Where these variables are constructed from individual bank data (e.g., MKT-P1, MKT-NPL),
the resulting market values are weighted averages of the variable values for the banks that have deposits in a specific market, where the weights are the banks’ deposit shares
in that market.
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markets. In the interest of brevity, variables used only in the robust-
ness checks are not shown in the tables.
A. Hypotheses about Entry
The major hypotheses about the causes of entry concern the expected
future profitability of a prospective entrant. We focus first on the
expected future profit opportunities afforded by M&A activity in the
local market. As indicated already, M&As may affect expected prof-
itability from entry by (1) changing the exercise of market power
in setting prices in the local market, (2) changing the efficiency of
the M&A participants or other local competitors, and (3) altering the
supply of services to small relationship-based customers in the local
market.
Based on the evidence summarized previously, the third effect of
bank M&As on entry (the external effect from a possible reduction
in the supply of services to small customers by banks engaging in
M&As) is likely to be the strongest. Potential M&As that would result
in large increases in market power likely do not occur often because
of antitrust authorities or fear of entry or responses of other com-
petitors. The only pronounced efficiency gains from bank M&As
appear to be gains from increases in diversification, which are ex-
pected to be strong only for market-extension type M&As. In contrast,
the effect of M&As involving large banks in reducing small business
lending is well established, and this the type of lending is the niche of
de novo banks for a number of years after entry.
There are a number of other influences on potential entrants’
expectations of future profitability and hence on entry. As indicated,
the literature often focuses on the recent profitability of incumbent
firms, recent market growth, and the level of market concentration as
proxies for expected future profits. Generally, recent profits, growth,
and concentration are expected to have positive effects on the prob-
ability of entry, all else equal, although concentration is sometimes
thought to have a negative effect on the probability of entry be-
cause high concentration may be an indicator of high barriers to
entry that are difficult to measure. We include these variables in our
empirical model. We hypothesize that the effects of profitability
and growth are positive and the effects of concentration depend on
whether it is more of a proxy for high profit opportunities or high
entry barriers.
We also include two variables that are similar in spirit to market
growth. The market’s ratio of purchased funds to total assets is in-
cluded as an indicator of lending opportunities that exceed locally
generated deposits. Similarly, state income growth is an indicator of
future profitable opportunities for new banks and is hypothesized to
have a positive effect on the likelihood of entry.
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The entry literature often includes measures of barriers to entry.
As discussed, the state banking regulations, such as unit banking rules,
act as barriers to entry by incumbent firms from other markets but
are not barriers to de novo entry. As shown in table 3, we include a
number of variables measuring these restrictions, including indicators
of unit banking restrictions, limited branching restrictions, and recent
changes in these restrictions. We hypothesize that legal restrictions on
branching by existing banks increase the probability of de novo entry
by creating local market power. We also include a variable for whether
BHCs from out of state may enter the market. The effect of this
variable is ambiguous, since state laws differ and some of them affect
both barriers to acquisitions by existing institutions and barriers to de
novo entry.
In addition, we include specific average market prices for major
outputs (consumer loans, non-real-estate business loans, real estate
loans, and securities) and inputs (purchased funds, core deposits, and
labor). We hypothesize that the probability of entry is increasing in the
output prices and decreasing in the input prices, all else equal, as high
output prices and low input prices are associated with profit oppor-
tunities. However, the prices that are interest rates (all but the labor
price) may reflect differences in risk across banking markets. High
average market rates charged on loans could reflect high default pre-
miums for lending to local customers, and high rates paid on liabilities
could reflect high relatively high bankruptcy probabilities for local
banks. If these risks deter entry, this could reverse the hypothesized
signs on the outputs (e.g., high loan rates would reduce the probability
of entry) but would reinforce the predicted signs on the funding inputs
(e.g., high rates would reduce the probability of entry because of both
low market power and high bankruptcy risk).
We also include a number of other factors shown in table 3.
We hypothesize that the presence of larger or more organizationally
complex banks increase the probability of entry, as large or complex
banks may be competitively disadvantaged in serving the small busi-
ness (relationship) customer niche in which de novo banks tend to
specialize. Therefore, we include variables for market shares of large
banks, medium-sized banks, and complex banks (small and noncom-
plex banks are the base groups). We also include measures of the
efficiency and financial condition of market banks, given that more-
efficient or financially sound incumbents should make stronger com-
petitors, which is likely to deter entry. However, it is alternatively
possible that better-performing incumbents in a market is a proxy for
favorable market conditions, which may encourage entry. Further, as
discussed, we control for the size of the banking market and whether it
is metropolitan or rural. Finally, to control for purely temporal effects,
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we include annual dummy variables for the years after the initial year
of our sample. As shown in table 3, we group our explanatory variables
into six broad categories: Market M&As, Other Competitive Con-
ditions, Market Demand Conditions, Market Prices, Condition of
Market Banks, and Temporal Conditions.
B. Methodology
We model the probability of entry based on M&As in the market and
other market variables hypothesized to affect the prospects for prof-
itable entry. We estimate the model a number of different ways for
several subsets of the data based on the sample period, market size,
and market type, but the main model is a simple logit equation of the
probability of entry in market m in year t, which takes the form:
lnðP ENTRYð Þm; t=ð1P ENTRYð Þm; tÞÞ¼ f ðMARKET M&Am; t1; t2; t3;
OTHER COMPETITIVE CONDITIONSm; t1;
MARKET DEMAND CONDITIONSm; t1;
MARKET PRICESm; t1;CONDITION
OF MARKET BANKSm; t1;
TEMPORAL CONDITIONStÞ þ "m; t ð1Þ
The data are annual, and entry is measured as having occurred or not
occurred during year t in market m. All the right-hand-side variables are
measured as of the end of year t  1 or earlier to reduce endogenous
feedback effects. For expositional clarity, most of these explanatory
variables shown in table 3 have the prefix MKT, indicating that they are
calculated for the market. In most cases, these are averages over the banks
that have deposits in the market weighted by each bank’s share of these
deposits. Other right-hand-side variables, such as the banking regulations,
are for the state in which the market is located.
Because prior research suggests that different types of M&As may
have different effects, we distinguish among the effects of different
types of consolidation. As shown in table 3, the MARKET M&A
variables included in our main model measure the proportion of
market deposits involved in recent bank mergers (MKT-MERGE), in
which two or more bank charters are consolidated, and the proportion
involved in BHC acquisitions (MKT-ACQUIS), in which the banks
retain their separate charters but their top-tier BHC ownership is
changed. For any merger of bank charters, the variable MKT-MERGE
rises in every market in which any of the merger partners had deposits.
Similarly, for any acquisition by a top-tier BHC of a group of banks
or another BHC that owns a group of banks, MKT-ACQUIS rises in
every market in which any of the directly acquired banks or banks in
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BHCs that were acquired had deposits. In our robustness checks, we
also distinguish between in-market and market-extension mergers,
mergers in which the pro forma consolidated bank is small versus
large, and mergers among BHC affiliates versus mergers of previously
unaffiliated banks.
We include 3 past years of M&As because prior analyses of bank
M&As and reports by bank consultants suggest that at least 3 years are
needed as a gestation period to complete any restructuring or refo-
cusing of a bank after an M&A (e.g., Cornett and Tehranian 1992;
Toevs 1992; Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998). The external
effect is likely to take at least as long as the effects on the institutions
involved in the M&As, implying that a minimum of 3 years is nec-
essary for the analysis. As well, the financial press reports that it often
takes 1–3 years after an M&A for the departing loan officers to start
a rival de novo bank (e.g., Epstein 1996). The main regressions we
report specify the average over years t  1, t  2, and t  3 of the
proportions of local market deposits in the offices of banks that were
involved in mergers or acquisitions. As shown later, the results are
robust with respect to an alternative specification in which the three
individual annual lags are included.9
VI. Empirical Results
Tables 4a and 4b show the results of the simple logit model of the
probability of entry in equation (1). Table 4a applies the model to large
metropolitan markets, small metropolitan markets, and rural markets
for the full 1980–1998 period, and table 4b repeats the exercise for the
1995–1998 subperiod, in which entry increased considerably. The full
time period has the advantage of more observations and coverage of
a broad range of macroeconomic, interest rate, and bank regulatory
conditions; and it may be more appropriate for testing the economic
hypotheses over the long term. The 1995–1998 subperiod may be
closer to the conditions for entry currently and in the near future. This
subperiod also covers the years after passage of the Riegle-Neal Act,
which may have affected both M&A and entry decisions.
The regressions exclude a small percentage of observations because
of missing or unreliable values of some of the variables. We also
eliminate a few large or unusual types of de novo entries. We eliminate
all entrants with GTAs exceeding $1 billion by the end of the entry year,
which may not fit our profile of small operators that enter to provide
services to small business customers. We also exclude commercial
9. In the interest of brevity, we will not discuss further the other exogenous variables
in the equation here. The rationales for including these variables were given in the
‘‘Hypotheses about Entry’’ subsection and the individual descriptions and summary statistics
on these variables are given in table 3.






























Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error















MKT-HERF 0.7165 1.3516 1.8134** 0.8007 1.4294*** 0.2959
MKT-SHAREL 6.3112*** 1.5173 0.8770 0.5380 0.7783*** 0.2379
MKT-SHAREM 6.3738*** 1.9047 0.7750 0.5057 0.1858 0.1579
MKT-SHAREC 0.7054
*










LIMITB 0.3698** 0.1844 0.0412 0.1317 0.3832*** 0.1089
NEWLIB 0.7740
**
0.3508 0.0062 0.2529 0.102 0.2141
INTST 0.5028 0.3245 0.2000 0.2035 0.0828 0.1558

































MKT-P3 14.6421*** 5.1292 9.4949*** 2.8328 2.997** 1.5595
MKT-P4 11.0121 10.9953 18.1692*** 6.4697 0.9828 4.3841
MKT-W1 6.3396 11.044 1.2996 5.4633 3.2236 2.3606
MKT-W2 14.2945 9.7704 17.8249** 7.2445 22.4935*** 4.9073
MKT-W3 0.0291 0.0184 0.0370** 0.0147 0.0025 0.0091
MKT-ROE 0.2857 1.0661 1.3389
**
0.6135 0.6098*** 0.1815
MKT-NPL 5.8419 6.8244 2.3018 4.4054 0.9191 2.0252


















































Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MKT-EFFIC 2.3880** 1.1779 1.6744** 0.6543 0.3633 0.4519
D1981 0.2111 0.498 0.6651
**
0.2776 0.2249 0.2129




































D1988 1.1596 0.8539 1.7641
***
0.4918 0.121 0.3215
D1989 1.2600 0.8478 1.4852
***
0.4897 0.3445 0.3344
D1990 0.9941 0.816 1.2728
***
0.4857 0.0473 0.3305
D1991 1.1388 0.8663 1.2185
**
0.5269 0.2339 0.3560
D1992 0.0701 0.9301 0.7545 0.5791 0.6926* 0.3866
D1993 0.8230 1.0129 0.1191 0.5917 1.3155*** 0.3986
D1994 0.3681 1.0456 1.0036 0.7071 1.5539*** 0.4225
D1995 0.6469 0.9911 0.8499 0.5465 1.1373*** 0.3682
D1996 0.2008 0.917 0.8964
*
0.5236 0.2966 0.3334
D1997 0.3814 0.9494 0.4424 0.5309 0.4046 0.3338
D1998 1.1804 0.9596 1.2123
**
0.5358 0.5761* 0.3498
Num. Obs. 1,316 4713 44,688
Adjusted R2 0.2287 0.1382 0.1017
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
The adjusted R2 for the logit equations measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model’s non-intercept independent variables, i.e., 1  ( log LALL)/













































Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error
INTERCEPT 12.8178* 7.1394 10.0232** 4.4075 20.5065*** 3.0758










MKT-HERF 2.7694 3.2458 4.4246** 1.8049 0.0290 0.8511
MKT-SHAREL 5.4667 4.9950 0.9364 1.4665 0.6667 0.5703
MKT-SHAREM 3.4495 6.3984 0.2549 1.4420 0.7596* 0.3993
MKT-SHAREC 0.8781 0.6562 0.6710 0.4349 0.3447 0.3330
LIMITB 0.4336 0.4994 0.1259 0.2643 0.7341*** 0.1821
MKT-GROW 1.0356 0.8389 0.4120 0.5236 0.6434 0.5075
STINCOME 23.2561
*
12.5409 3.2218 6.5365 1.8830 4.6638











MKT-P1 6.3482 8.3047 1.2652 5.3978 5.2187 3.2473
MKT-P2 5.1524 9.3966 3.5418 4.0489 0.4736 2.6579
MKT-P3 55.6001* 28.6133 3.9843 15.2674 2.3937 8.0891
MKT-P4 21.3150 33.5434 30.7585** 15.3177 8.7144 15.0744
MKT-W1 36.5973 39.6541 4.8075 23.0424 10.7385 14.6081
MKT-W2 17.7681 42.0028 77.3761
***
26.2980 30.4855* 17.8204


















































Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error Parameter Estimate Standard Error
MKT-ROE 9.5023
*
5.6274 0.6082 1.2376 0.0274 2.7227
MKT-NPL 60.0671** 29.8173 46.0577** 18.2374 0.6843 8.7637
MKT-EQRAT 10.2621 21.4244 24.1610** 11.6090 4.9476 6.8401
MKT-EFFIC 0.9550 2.2221 3.5840*** 1.1931 1.6461 1.0393
D1996 1.5414
**
0.7203 0.5471 0.4704 0.6413* 0.3406
D1997 1.1365 0.9138 0.4396 0.5605 0.9611** 0.3848
D1998 2.6543
***
0.657 0.0734 0.4218 0.2797 0.3357
Num. Obs. 303 969 9,407
Adjusted R2 0.2150 0.0898 0.1299
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
The adjusted R2 for the logit equations measures the proportion of the log-likelihood value explained by the model’s non-intercept independent variables, i.e., 1  ( log LALL)/
( log LINT), where LALL denotes the likelihood value of estimation with all the independent variables and LINT denotes the likelihood value of estimation with only the intercept.
Some missing or unusual coefficients and standard errors appear for some of the state banking regulation variables for the 1995–1998 subperiod because most of the
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banks with bank types coded as subject to special analysis, such as
bankers’ banks, credit card banks with commercial bank charters, de-
pository trust companies, and bridge entities. The means and standard
deviations in table 3 also reflect these exclusions. We further restrict the
definition of entry in a robustness check discussed later.
A. The Effects of M&As on Subsequent Entry
The data are strongly consistent with the hypothesis that M&As are
associated with subsequent increases in the probability of entry into
the markets in which the M&As occur. For the full 1980–1998 data
set shown in table 4a, the coefficients on the proportions of market
deposits involved in recent bank mergers (MKT-MERGE) and in BHC
acquisitions (MKT-ACQUIS) are positive and statistically significant
in all three types of markets (large metropolitan, small metropolitan,
and rural); four of the six parameters are significant at the 1% level,
one is significant at the 5% level, and one is significant at the 10%
level.10 For the 1995–1998 subperiod shown in table 4b, the coef-
ficients of MKT-MERGE and MKT-ACQUIS remain positive in all
cases, but the degree of statistical significance is less. One of the six
parameters is significant at the 1% level, one is significant at the 5%
level, two are significant at the 10% level. The drop in significance
from the full sample to the 1995–1998 subsample is not surprising,
given that most of the observations are excluded. In addition, there
is less variance in most of the economic conditions specified in the
exogenous variable list during the subperiod, which makes accurate
estimation more difficult.
The results of these logit equations also suggest that M&As have
an economically significant impact as well as a statistically significant
impact on the probability of de novo entry. We summarize the eco-
nomic impact by estimating the predicted decrease in entry probabil-
ity from reducing M&A activity. For the full 1980–1998 data set
for large metropolitan markets, reducing MKT-MERGE and MKT-
ACQUIS from their mean values of 0.181 and 0.035, respectively, to
zero (multiplied by the corresponding coefficients from the first col-
umn of table 4a of 0.9936 and 4.1309, respectively) implies a de-
crease in the predicted probability of de novo entry from its actual
mean of 48.9% to 40.9%.11 This is a decrease of 8.0 percentage points
10. The coefficients for MKT-MERGE and MKT-ACQUIS are significantly different
from each other at the 10% level for the large metropolitan markets but not for other
markets.
11. We base the economic significance evaluations on the sample mean value of the data
used in the logit equations of 48.9%, as shown in table 3, rather than the slightly different
mean of 51.32% shown earlier. As noted previously, the data used in the logit equations
exclude some observations with missing or unreliable values of some of the variables and
large or unusual types of de novo entries.
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or 16.4%.12 An alternative summary statistic for the effects of M&As
is to measure the consequence of the change from the 75th to the 25th
percentiles of the distributions of the M&A variables, as in Rajan and
Zingales (1998). For the large metropolitan markets, this implies a
decrease in the predicted probability of entry from 52.9% to 42.2%,
a decline of 10.7 percentage points or a 20.2% decrease. For small
metropolitan markets, moving from the means of the M&A variables
to zero reduces the mean predicted probability from 14.2% to 12.8%,
a decline of 1.4 percentage points or 9.9%; and the change from the
75th to the 25th percentiles yields a decrease in the probability of
entry from 16.0% to 12.8%, a decline of 3.2 percentage points or
20.0%. For rural markets, moving from the means to zero or from the
75th to the 25th percentiles gives the same reduction in predicted
probability of entry from 1.8% to 1.6%, an 11.1% decrease. There-
fore, approximating the effects of M&As by moving from the means
of the M&A variables to zero or from the 75th to the 25th percentiles
reduces the proportion of the markets with entry by about 10–20%,
which is economically significant.
The estimated parameters for the M&A variables in the logit
equations using the 1995–1998 subsample shown in table 4b are
larger than those for the full sample in five of six cases, and there is
more M&A activity in this subperiod. Therefore, the data from this
subperiod imply greater estimated economic significance, although
with reduced statistical significance. Overall, the logit regressions
suggest a strong, statistically significant and economically significant
effect of M&As on subsequent entry, especially in metropolitan
markets.
B. Robustness of the Findings
To assure confidence in our main findings, we run three sets of ro-
bustness checks. The first set keeps the exogenous variables and data
samples the same as in the main runs but uses alternative econometric
methods to the logit model of entry. The second set uses the main
econometric specifications and data samples but alters the speci-
fications of the exogenous variables. The third set uses the main
econometric specification and exogenous variables but alters the data
samples. To save space, the robustness results are summarized here
but not shown in the tables.
The following alternative econometric specifications were tried:
ordinary least squares, or OLS (i.e., a linear probability model of entry
12. Beginning at the mean probability of entry of 0.489, the effect of decreasing MKT-
MERGE by 0.181 and MKT-ACQUIS by 0.035 is calculated as decreasing the probability of
entry to P1 in the formula ln P1= 1 P1ð Þ½  ¼ ln 0:489= 1 0:489ð Þ½   0:9936  0:181ð Þ 
4:1309  0:035ð Þ.
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versus no entry); Tobit (in which the number of entries in each market
in each year is the dependent variable); OLS in which the number of
entries was the dependent variable; OLS in which the dependent
variable was 1 plus the log of the number of entries; and ordered lo-
gits for various categorizations of the multiple numbers of entry per
market. The coefficients on the M&A (MKT-MERGE and MKT-
ACQUIS) variables remained positive and significant in almost all
instances. We also employed a more complete fixed-effects approach
with dummy variables for individual markets to allow for the possi-
bility that the markets have important characteristics that make them
attractive both to M&As and entry that are not captured by our ex-
planatory variables.13 For the complete sample, all six M&A coef-
ficients remain positive, although with reduced levels of statistical
and economic significance.14 For the 1995–1998 subperiod, five of the
six M&A variables remain positive.
Turning next to our robustness checks that use alternative spec-
ifications of the exogenous variables, we tried the following var-
iations of the exogenous variables: distinguishing between in-market
versus market-extension mergers; distinguishing between mergers
in which the pro forma consolidated bank is small versus large; dis-
tinguishing between mergers of affiliates of a holding company versus
mergers of previously unaffiliated banks; specifying the individual
t  1, t  2, and t  3 lags of the main M&A variables instead of the
3-year averages; adding lags to the variable that represents a state’s
change to a more liberal branching regime (NEWLIB); and adding
second-order terms on the continuous exogenous variables to allow
for nonlinearities (e.g., O MKT-HERF2). Again, our main results
emerge: The coefficients on the M&A variables generally remain
positive and economically significant, with some weakening of sta-
tistical significance.
We finally turn to our robustness checks that alter the data sam-
ples. First, we include thrift entry as well as commercial bank entry
in the dependent variable, similar to Seelig and Critchfield (2002).
Our results for this data modification are even stronger than our main
results just reported. When we include thrift entry we find that, for
the full sample, all six coefficients of the M&A variables are positive
13. This approach was complicated by the large number of markets in our sample. For
the large metropolitan markets, we were able to estimate our basic logit regressions with 83
market dummy variables included. For the small metropolitan and rural regressions, the
numbers of markets were too large. Instead, a linear probability approach (OLS) was used
with all variable values subtracted from their respective market means. This yields slope
coefficients identical to those that would be yielded by the inclusion of a complete set of
market dummy variables.
14. For example, for the large metropolitan markets, moving from the means of the
M&A variables to zero would imply a reduction in entry to a mean level of 43.0% (from
48.9%), a reduction of 6.9 percentage points or 12.1%.
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and statistically significant at the 1% level; and for the 1995–1998
subsample, all six are positive and five of the six are statistically
significant at some level. The coefficients are also of the same order
of magnitude as in the main results. We further restricted the data
sample to the years 1995–1997 (similar to Seelig and Critchfield’s
original paper). Four of the six M&A variables remain positive and
statistically significant. Next, we employed a more conservative
definition of the dependent variable, in which we counted as an
‘‘entrant’’ only a bank that had less than $100 million in assets at the
end of its first year, had an equity ratio of at least 20%, and was
involved in no M&A activity itself. Using this restricted dependent
variable, the six coefficients on the M&A variables remained positive
and with approximately the same levels of economic significance,
although only two of the six coefficients attain significance (at the
1% level).
In sum, our statistically and economically significant positive re-
lationship between M&As and the probability of de novo entry is quite
robust. The alternative econometric methods, alternative exogenous
variable specifications, and alternative data samples all support our
main results.
C. The Effects of Variables Other than M&As on Entry
The estimated coefficients on the variables other than M&As in tables
4a and 4b are mostly consistent with the hypotheses given earlier,
although they are often not statistically significant. We hypothesized
that market profits, market growth in deposits, and related variables
like the purchased funds ratio and the growth of state income should
have positive effects on expected future profitability and the like-
lihood of de novo entry. The coefficients of the profitability variable
MKT-ROE in tables 4a and 4b are mixed—positive for the metro-
politan markets but negative for the rural markets—giving no clear
effect of profitability on the likelihood of entry, after M&As and all
the other factors are controlled for in the regressions. The coefficients
of MKT-GROW are always negative but not statistically significant,
but the coefficients of MKT-PFRAT and STGROWare all positive and
statistically significant for the full data sample, giving support for the
importance of some of the factors that are similar to growth but not
supporting the growth of the market itself as predicting more entry
after controlling for these other factors.
We also predicted that concentration may have a positive effect on
the probability of entry if it proxies mostly profit opportunities from
market power and a negative impact if it proxies mostly high entry
barriers. The coefficients of MKT-HERF are of mixed signs and
mostly not statistically significant, giving no evidence that either ef-
fect dominates.
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We hypothesized that state banking regulations that create barriers to
entry by incumbent firms from other markets may increase the prob-
ability of entry. The coefficients of UNITB are positive, statistically
significant, and larger than the LIMITB coefficients for the full time
period, consistent with the hypothesis. The coefficients of LIMITB are
positive and significant for rural markets in both time periods, also
consistent with the hypothesis. However, the LIMITB coefficients have
mixed signs for the metropolitan markets, presumably because limited
branching laws typically allow unlimited branching within counties
and mostly keep large banks based in metropolitan counties from
branching elsewhere. States with newly liberalized branching rules
(NEWLIB) have positive coefficients, suggesting that part or all of the
effect of moving from unit or limited to statewide branching status
or from limited to statewide branching is offset in the initial year.15
Interstate BHC access (INTST), which has an ambiguous predicted
effect, has mixed coefficients.
As discussed, the probability of entry may be positively or nega-
tively related to output prices, depending on whether high rates proxy
more for profitable opportunities ( positive) versus high default risks
(negative). The results are somewhat mixed, with the prices of con-
sumer loans (P1) and non-real-estate business loans (P2) generally
being positively related to the probability of entry and the price of real
estate loans (P3) being negatively and statistically significantly related
to the probability of entry for the full sample. These results suggest
that while market power in pricing loans may encourage entry in
some cases, a high price of real estate loans more likely signals high
default probabilities in the market, which may deter future bank entry.
The input prices (W1, W2, W3) generally have the negative hypoth-
esized signs for the full sample.
We hypothesized that greater market shares of large or organiza-
tionally complex banks increase the probability of entry, but the data
are only half consistent with this. The regressions in tables 4a and 4b
suggest that a greater presence of larger banks (SHAREL or SHAREM)
discourages entry, contrary to expectations, while a greater presence
of complexly organized banks (owned by out-of-state or multilayered
BHCs) encourages entry, consistent with expectations.
We hypothesized that more efficient or financially sound incum-
bents may be stronger competitors and deter entry. Again, the data are
mixed. High equity capital (MKT-EQRAT) is associated with less
entry in small metropolitan and rural markets, as predicted, and the
coefficients of efficiency (MKT-EFFIC) are usually negative, as pre-
dicted. But the coefficients of nonperforming loans (MKT-NPL) are
15. Two additional lagged values for NEWLIB were tried but were not statistically
significant and had no material effect on the results.
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generally negative, contrary to the prediction. As noted, it is also
possible that better-performing incumbents in a market is a proxy for
favorable market conditions that encourage entry, which may explain
the latter results.
Further, we hypothesized that larger markets and metropolitan
markets would have more entry. Our main controls for these are in
setting up the separate regressions for the large metropolitan, small
metropolitan, and rural data subsets. Within these regressions, the log
of market deposits (MKT-LNDEP) always has a positive, statistically
significant coefficient, consistent with expectations. The additional
size class dummies have insignificant coefficients, suggesting that our
division of the data into subsets plus including MKT-LNDEP was
sufficient to account for most of the effects of market size.
Finally, the magnitudes and statistical significance of the coef-
ficients on our annual dummy variables track the general pattern of
entry shown in table 2, rising during most of the 1980s, declining in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and recovering somewhat in the late
1990s. This pattern is generally consistent with the positive effects
of the OCC charter liberalization and unit banking restrictions in the
early and mid-1980s, the deterioration in banking conditions in the
late 1980s to early 1990s, and the recovery in banking conditions at
the end of the sample period. Importantly, our main results con-
cerning the effects of M&As on entry are robust and relatively un-
affected by the presence or absence of the annual dummy variables,
suggesting that our main results about the effects of M&As are in
addition to these overall temporal patterns.
Overall, the results are strongly consistent with the positive effects
of M&As and market size, although most of the other hypotheses
receive only mixed support.
VII. Conclusions
We study the dynamics of market entry following mergers and
acquisitions. Our empirical application focuses on the commercial
banking industry, which provides a superior laboratory for analyzing
these effects, because banks produce relatively homogeneous products
in a large number of geographically segmented markets under dif-
ferent conditions. We are able to trace the effects of over 10,000
M&As in over 2,700 local banking markets during a period of 19 years,
with over 52,000 market-year observations, and almost 4,000 actual
market entries.
Our findings are strongly consistent with the hypothesis that M&As
are associated with subsequent increases in the probability of entry
into the markets in which the M&As occur. The results are both
statistically and economically significant. Our approximation of the
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effects of M&As by moving from the means of the M&A variables to
zero or from the 75th to the 25th percentiles reduces the proportion of
the markets with entry by about 10–20% of all entry, which is eco-
nomically significant. We also run three sets of robustness checks that
(1) use alternative econometric methods, (2) change the specifications
of the exogenous variables, and (3) alter the data samples. These
findings support our main result that M&As tend to increase the
probability of subsequent de novo entry.
The findings also have implications for policy and future research.
With respect to policy, the result that the probability of entry increases
substantially after local market M&As tends to support a continued
role for prospective entry in antitrust analysis. The findings are also
consistent with an external effect of consolidation in which any re-
duction in small business lending by M&A participants may be par-
tially replaced by new entrants.
With respect to future research, the findings suggest that M&As and
possibly other actions of incumbent firms should be included in future
models of entry in both industrial organization and banking research.
The results also suggest that effort be invested in evaluating a number
of different external effects of M&As on the behavior of other mar-
ket participants beyond what has been considered here. In addition to
entry and output, the responses of other firms in terms of their prices,
locations, and product mix could be included in future industrial or-
ganization research. In banking research in particular, the external
effects of M&As on deposit and loan interest rates, quantities of other
types of loans, geographical distributions of deposits, and quantity and
location of bank branches could be further studied.
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